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LAWYER ADVERTISING
Since the Supreme Court ruled that commercial speech was entitled to
first amendment protection,1 the regulation of advertising by attorneys has
been well-debated and much litigated. 2 Though not used extensively by a
majority of attorneys, 3 it is clear that media advertising has become an
effective tool for disseminating information about legal services. 4 How-
ever, state bar associations have generally balked at the increased use of
advertising, and have loosened the traditional restrictions5 only
grudgingly.6
Washington's recently adopted Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC)
regarding attorney advertising, 7 are practically identical to the Model Rules
of Professional Responsibility (Model Rules) 8 adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1983. The Rules of Professional Conduct maintain
the unfortunate distinction between "advertising" and "solicitation" 9 but
1. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
769-70 (1976). The first amendment protection afforded commerial speech is derived from the public's
right to know. Id. at 769-70. Protection of speech that does "no more than propose a commercial
transaction" is essential to the operation of the marketplace of ideas. Whitman & Stoltenberg, The
Present Constitutional Status of Lawyer Advertising, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 445, 453 (1983). The
Supreme Court also recognized that consumers' interest in the free access to information about
commercial transactions may be greater than their interest in the political events of the day. Virginia
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-64.
2. See, e.g., Zaudererv. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985); In re R.M.L, 455
U.S. 191 (1982); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Cf. The Florida Bar v. Schreiber,
407 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1982) (letter to international trade company recommending attorney's services was
direct solicitation and not protected); Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 362 So.2d 489 (La. 1978)
(mailing description of prepaid legal services plan could be constitutionally prohibited). See generally
Note, Lawyer Communication with Prospective Clients: Ethics v. the First Amendment, 61 U. DET. J.
URB. L. 403 (1984) (discussion of various state cases).
3. Figa, Lawyer Solicitation Today and Under The Proposed ModelRules of Professional Conduct,
52 U. COLO. L. REv. 393, 393 n.2 (1981).
4. Whitman & Stoltenberg, Direct MailAdvertising By Lawyers, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 381,416-19
(1984). Direct mall advertising, for example, allows the advertising to be directed at a well defined
audience, is flexible with regard to length, timing, and form, and permits faster and more accurate
evaluation of effectiveness than do other forms of advertising. Id. See also Figa, supra note 3, at 393 n.3
($1.00 spent on advertising yields $7.93 return in fees).
5. In Bates, the Court noted that the taboo on advertising by attorneys "originated as a rule of
etiquette and not as a rule of ethics." Bates, 433 U.S. at 371.
6. Whitman & Stoltenberg, supra note 4, at 381-82 & n.5.
7. Washington Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) Rules 7.1-7.5 (1985).
8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT (Model Rules) Rules 7.1-7.5 (1983). For a discussion
of the differences between the Model Rules and the RPC on advertising, see infra note 12 (discussing the
specialty advertising rule), and notes 69-73 and accompanying text (discussing the RPC prohibiting the
use of trade names except in limited circumstances).
9. According to one commentator, "to distinguish between advertising and solicitation by mail is
to make a distinction without a difference." Thurman, Direct Mail: Advertising or Solicitation? A
Distinction Without a Difference, 11 STMON L. REv. 403, 427 (1982)).
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generally represent an improvement over the previous Code of Professional
Responsibility. 10 However, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Zauderer v. Office ofDisciplinary Counsel, I I at least two of the Washington
Rules appear to unconstitutionally restrict attorney advertising. 12
This Survey Comment will give a brief synthesis of the constitutional law
underlying the area of attorney advertising, and take a more detailed look at
the Zauderer decision. While an overview of the Washington Rules has
been given elsewhere in this issue, 13 the primary focus of this comment will
be on how the rules meet, and fall short of, the constitutional standards
clarified in Zauderer. In particular, the prohibition of direct mail contact
with specific persons known to need legal services in a specific matter
appears to be unconstitutional. Additionally, the Washington rule limiting
the use of trade names may be invalid.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
A. Advertising
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 14 the Supreme Court recognized an
attorney's right to advertise the availability and prices of routine legal
10. See Washington Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rules (DR) 2-101 to 105
(1984). For example, the RPC abandon the ambiguous requirement that advertisements be presented in
a "dignified manner." Washington DR 2-101(B). It is certainly in the best interest of the attorney who
chooses to advertise not to offend the audience of the advertisement. However, preserving the dignity of
advertising is not a sufficient state interest to justify the restriction of constitutionally protected speech.
See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
11. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985) (targeted newspaper advertisement with accurate and nonmisleading
illustration and legal advice not grounds for imposing discipline).
12. See infra notes 48-68 and accompanying text (discussing RPC Rule 7.3); notes 69-73 and
accompanying text (discussing RPC Rule 7.5). RPC Rule 7.4 allows attorneys to indicate which fields
they do or do not practice in, but prohibits attorneys from indicating any specialty other than a
certification to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. At least one state
supreme court has found truthful and nonmisleading advertising of specialized expertise to be constitu-
tionally protected commercial speech, even in the absence of a state sponsored system of testing and
certification. In re Johnson, 341 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1983). But see Note, In re Johnson: A Lawyer's
Right To Advertise Specialized Expertise, 29 S.D.L. REv. 527, 537 (1984) (concluding that where state
bar association has determined and documented its decision that a certification plan cannot be
implemented immediately and that no less restrictive alternative for the regulation of specialty
advertising is available, a ban on such advertising could be justified).
13. For a detailed discussion of the RPC, see Aronson, An Overview of the Law of Professional
Responsibility: The Rules of Professional Conduct Annotated and Analyzed, 61 WASH. L. REV. 823
(1986).
14. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Two Arizona attorneys placed an advertisement in a Phoenix newspaper,
stating that their legal clinic would provide services at reasonable fees and listed several routine services
with exact prices for each. Id. at 354. The attorneys conceded that the advertisement violated the
applicable rule, but interposed the first amendment as their defense to the discipline imposed by the
state. Id. at 356.
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services. 15 Such advertisements could, however, be prohibited if they were
false, misleading, or proposed unlawful activities. 16 The Court rejected the
interests advanced by the state to justify the ban on nonmisleading adver-
tisements regarding prices as not sufficient to allow an infringement on the
freedom of commercial speech. 17 Unfortunately, state bar associations
expanded their advertising rules to comply only with a narrow reading of
the Bates decision. 18
In In re R.M.J., 19 the Court reinforced its message. It reiterated that
misleading advertising could be entirely prohibited. However, advertising
that was only potentially misleading, or that had not been shown to be
misleading could only be regulated through narrowly crafted means. 20
Additionally, accurate advertising could only be regulated when the state
could advance substantial interests and could show that the means chosen
would directly advance those interests.21 Thus, the attorney could not be
disciplined for listing the courts in which he was admitted to practice, 22 for
using designations for his areas of practice similar, but not identical to
those listed in the Disciplinary Rules,2 3 or for mailing announcement cards
to persons other than family, friends, other attorneys, clients, and former
clients. 24 In particular, the Court found that such a mailing could not be
prohibited in the absence of an attempt to regulate along less restrictive
lines.25
15. Id. at 384.
16. Id. at 383-84.
17. Id. at 368-69. The state advanced six interests to justify the regulation, including: (1) the
adverse effect on professionalism, (2) the inherently misleading nature of attorney advertising, (3) the
adverse effect on the administration of justice, (4) the undesirable economic effects of advertising, (5)
the adverse effect of advertising on the quality of service, and (6) the difficulties of enforcement. See
generally Recent Decisions, Attorney Advertising-First Amendment, 23 DuQ. L. REv. 305, 312-13
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Recent Decisions] (discussing the opinions of the justices in Bates).
18. See supra note 6.
19. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
20. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203-04.
21. Id. See generally Whitman&Stoltenberg, supra note 4, at 397-99 &n.82 (noting that the court
is essentially applying the four-part test announced in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980)).
22. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205.
23. Id.
24. Id. See generally Note, In re Utah Bar Petition: Pursuing a Chimeric and Ultimately Uncon-
stitutional Goal, 11 . CoNTEM'. L. 547, 550-53 (1985).
25. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206.
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B. Solicitation
The companion cases of Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association26 and In
re Primus27 represented "opposite end[s] of the solicitation scale." '28
Together they held that when in-person solicitation of employment by an
attorney is done for pecuniary gain alone it may be prohibited, 29 but it may
be permissible when the solicitation is motivated by a desire to exercise
constitutionally protected freedoms such as speech and assembly. 30 The
dangers of a trained advocate exerting undue influence on a potentially
vulnerable client, and especially the pressure to make a hasty, ill-consid-
ered and uninformed decision about the representation were strong enough
to persuade the Court that in-person solicitation for monetary gain could be
completely banned. 31
C. Zauderer
In the Zauderer decision, 32 the Supreme Court held that an "attorney
may not be disciplined for soliciting legal business through printed adver-
tising containing truthful and nondeceptive information and advice regard-
ing the legal rights of potential clients" in a specific legal problem. 33
Attorney Zauderer had placed advertisements in thirty-six newspapers. The
ads were targeted towards Dalkon Shield users, and offered to represent
them in suits against the manufacturer on a contingent fee basis. 34
26. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
27. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
28. Recent Decisions, supra note 17, at 314-15.
29. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449. Ohralik went to the home of a driver shortly after learning that she
had been in an accident, and later obtained her signature on a contingent fee agreement before she left
the hospital. Ohralik also approached the passenger in the car, having learned in his visit with the
driver's parents that the insurance policy contained an uninsured motorist clause that would pay out
$12,500. Both driver and passenger eventually dismissed Ohralik, although the driver was forced to pay
one-third of her eventual recovery to settle the breach of contract claim. Id. at 449-52.
30. Primus, 436 U.S. at 437-38. Primus, an ACLU attorney, contacted by letter a woman she
thought wanted to file suit for being required to undergo sterilization as a condition to the continued
receipt of Medicaid benefits. After the doctor who had sterilized the woman obtained a copy of the letter
and shared the letter with his lawyer, Primus was charged with unethical solicitation. Primus, 436 U.S.
at 414-17. Finding that the letter came within first amendment protections for speech and associational
activity for political purposes, the court ruled that Primus could not be disciplined. Id. at 438-39. See
generally Note, Direct-Mail Solicitation By Attorneys: Bates to R.M.J., 33 SYRACRUSE L. REv. 1041,
1049-51 (1982) (discussing Primus and Ohralik).
31. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-67. But cf Figa, supra note 3, at 402-08 & nn. 30-35 (concluding
that Proposed Rule 9.2, 1980 Discussion Draft of ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, allowing
attorneys to initiate contact with prospective clients in certain circumstances, was "sensitive to the
constitutional issues, yet go[es] beyond the. . . constitutional minimums for advertising and solicita-
tion.").
32. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
33. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2280.
34. Id. at 2272. The Court upheld Zauderer's discipline on the matter that his advertisement did not
Vol. 61:903, 1986
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Zauderer's advertisement was controversial in three respects. First, it
contained an illustration accurately depicting the Dalkon Shield.35 Second,
it was targeted toward specific clients, arguably making it solicitation. 36
Third, it contained legal advice, since it informed readers that they should
not assume their claims were time barred. 37 The Court found that none of
these factors made Zauderer subject to discipline. 38
Additionally, the dangers that caused in-person solicitation to be disci-
plined in Ohralik were not sufficiently strong in the targeted advertising in
Zauderer. There was no problem of overreaching or invasion of privacy
since the advocate was not personally present and pressing for an immedi-
ate answer. 39 Finally, the Court found that the advertisement did not act to
"stir up" litigation, rather it informed potential clients of their rights.40
Since the advertisement was not false or misleading, the burden was on
the state to show the necessity for an absolute prohibition of targeted
advertising. 41 Without a showing of a substantial state interest in prohibit-
ing this kind of speech, and since the state was unable to show that narrower
divulge the liability for costs, regardless of the outcome of the Dalkon Shield suit. Id. at 2282-83.
Additionally, the Court upheld his discipline in so far as it was based on an advertisement offering to
refund legal fees if the client was convicted of drunk driving. Id. at 2284. The advertisement had been
found misleading because it failed to inform readers of the possibility of plea bargaining. Id. at 2273.
35. Id. at 2271. It thus violated Ohio Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-101(B), which prohibited the use of
illustrations in attorney advertising. The Court found that the illustration accurately depicted the Dalkon
Shield, and rejected the state's assertion that the use of illustrations could be completely banned due to
their inherent potential to mislead or manipulate consumers. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2280-81.
36. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2274.
37. Id. at 2271. By taking employment from responses to the advertisements, Zauderer violated
DR 2-104(A), which prohibited attorneys from accepting clients as a result of unsolicited legal advice.
However, the Court found the advice was "completely unobjectionable" since the Ohio Supreme Court
had adopted the "discovery rule" for when a cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes.
Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2276-77. It was therefore up to the state to show a substantial state interest in
prohibiting such speech. Id. at 2277. The Court saw the information as doing no more than providing
citizens with accurate information about their legal rights. Id. at 2278.
38. Id. at 2284. The Court drew on the experience of the Federal Trade Commission and found that
there was no qualitative difference between assessing the accuracy of advertising for consumer goods
and for professional services. Id. at 2279. This settled a question left open in the Bates decision. Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. at 372-74. The dissenters in Zauderer took strong exception with this
point. They maintained that there was a qualitative difference since, compared with advertising for
consumer goods, advertising for legal services posed an increased risk of consumer confusion and
deception. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2295-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dissent argued
that an inevitable conflict of interest existed between the potential client's right to unbiased legal advice
and the attorney's pecuniary interests. Together, these factors were enough to persuade the dissenters
(O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Berger) to defer to the state's judgment that legal advice in advertising
should be completely banned. Id. at 2296-97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
39. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2277.
40. Id. at 2278.
41. Id. at 2277.
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means of regulation were not available, Zauderer could not be disci-
plined. 42 The accuracy and validity of Zauderer's statements could be
assessed, and the assessment was not so difficult as to justify an absolute
prohibition. 43
II. WASHINGTON RULES
As discussed earlier,44 the Washington RPC are practically identical to
the Model Rules. The rules as adopted are much more restrictive than the
discussion draft of the Model Rules that was circulated in 1980, 45 or the
proposed final draft in 1982.46 Restricting advertisement as much as
possible has been a consistent tactic of the bar.47
The Washington RPC regarding attorney advertising comport with con-
stitutional standards regarding false, misleading, or unlawful advertising in
that such advertising is prohibited. 48 The RPC also impose certain record-
keeping requirements on attorneys and require disclosure of at least one
attorney who is responsible for the advertisement's content. 49 These rules
are beneficial because they will facilitate disciplinary action when it be-
comes necessary.
While authorizing "advertising" in all public media, 50 the RPC prohibit
"solicitation." 51 As defined, solicitation properly includes in-person and
telephone contact of prospective clients. 52 Excluded from the definition are
generally addressed mailings or circulars to groups who might find legal
services helpful, but are not known to need assistance in a particular
matter.53 Thus, the RPC follow In re R.M.J. to the extent that accurate,
nonmisleading direct mailings are not totally prohibited. 54
The rules do, however, prohibit the use of mailings directed to specific
persons known to need particular legal services. 55 The comments to Model
42. Id. at 2280.
43. Id. at 2279.
44. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
45. See generally Figa, supra note 3, at 402-408.
46. The Model Rules, as adopted, were intended to be much stricter than the proposed final draft.
Franck, The Proposed Model Rules: Solicitation, 62 MICH. B. J. 386, 386-87. See generally Note,
supra note 29, at 1067-72 (discussing the proposed final draft of the Model Rules).
47. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
48. RPC Rule7.1.
49. RPC Rule 7.2.
50. RPC Rule 7.2(a).
51. RPC Rule 7.3.
52. RPC Rule 7.3. See generally Whitman & Stoltenberg, supra note 4, at 416 n. 160 (it is likely
that use of telephone solicitation is subject to prohibition under Ohralik).
53. RPC Rule 7.3.
54. See generally Note, supra note 30, at 1061-67.
55. RPC Rule 7.3.
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Rule 7.356 make clear that the American Bar Association adopted the same
position as the dissenters in Zauderer: that specifically addressed direct
mail communication to persons known to need legal services would present
the same dangers as in-person solicitation, i.e., invasion of privacy, over-
reaching, and coercion; that the use of such mailings creates an impermissi-
ble conflict of interest between the attorney's pecuniary interest and the
client's interest in unbiased information; and that no reasonably effective
and less restrictive means of regulating these mailings can be devised. 57
The prohibition created by the rule completely contradicts the principles
that support advertising by attorneys. Commercial speech is protected
because of the public's right to know the information it needs to make
important decisions. 58 By not allowing direct mail contact with persons
with known legal needs, the rule denies attorneys an effective method of
disseminating their information to those consumers with the most immedi-
ate need for it.
Equating the use of mail to contact specific persons with the in-person
solicitation in Ohralik is an improper analogy. Although a letter from an
attorney might be considered more important than other kinds of "junk"
mail,59 any coercive impact would be greatly decreased by the less restric-
tive alternative of stamping "THIS IS AN ADVERTISEMENT" on the
envelopes and letters. 6° Additionally, a requirement that such mailings be
filed with the state bar associations 61 along with the record-keeping re-
quirements in the rules would ease the problem of proving the fraudulent or
misleading nature of an advertisement. The ad must not be false or mislead-
ing within the meaning of RPC Rule 7.1, or it will be subject to discipline in
any event. 62 Finally, the letter does not pack the same coercive punch as the
actual presence of an attorney; the consumer may simply throw it away.63
56. Model Rule 7.3 comment. Unfortunately, the Washington Supreme Court failed to adopt the
Commentary to the Model Rules, and provided none of its own. However, where the rules are identical,
the commentary should be used to shed light on the meaning of the rules. See Aronson, supra note 13, at
827-28.
57. See supra note 38; Model Rule 7.3 comment.
58. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2279-80; see supra note 1.
59. See Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 407 So.2d 595, 598-99 (Fla. 1981); see generally Whitman &
Stoltenberg, supra note 4, at 407-10 (principal trait of state court decisions prohibiting direct mail
advertising is their emphasis on the solicitation aspects of the mailings).
60. See R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206 n.20 (labeling letter as advertisement would decrease the
"frightening" effect of receiving a letter from a lawyer).
61. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206. Cf. Model Rule 7.3 comment (state lawyer discipline agencies
struggle for enough manpower to investigate complaints; screening of letters would be impossible).
62. See RPC Rule 7.1.
63. See Recent Decisions, supra note 17, at 309-10 n.40 (citing Spencer v. The Honorable Justices
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 579 F. Supp. 880, 890 (E.D. Pa. 1984); forces of in-person
solicitation not present in direct mail solicitation because recipient not under pressure and had time for
reflection).
909
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The argument that mailings to persons with known legal needs will draw
unsuspecting potential clients into the office where the dangers of in-person
solicitation arise assumes too much. 64 The danger for overreaching exists in
any attorney-client encounter. If the advertisement is properly written, it
will provide the potential clients with important information that may allow
the choice of a competent, willing, and available attorney. If the advertise-
ment is fraudulent or misleading, the client will have tort or contract
remedies. Additionally, discipline will be available against the attorney
both for the advertisement and for the improper influencing of a client. 65
RPC Rule 7.3's prohibition is improper for one additional reason: the
state has not made any attempt to use less restrictive means to regulate these
mailings. 66 Absent a showing that such mailings are misleading or false,
the state is required to show a substantial state interest and a narrowly
crafted means of regulation, directly advancing that interest. 67 Labeling
and registration, along with individual investigations, should be tried
before imposing an absolute ban. If these methods prove unworkable, then
a ban could be imposed to protect potentially vulnerable consumers.
Two commentators have provided the following guidelines that will be
useful in developing direct mail advertising that will comport with RPC
Rule 7.3 as it now stands. 68 First, the content of the mailings should be
carefully reviewed to prevent it from being false or misleading; accuracy
and clarity are essential. Second, mailings should be written with an
information-giving tone; any language that could be viewed as direct
solicitation should be avoided. Third, care must be exercised in the target-
ing of the mailings; since the rules allow only general mailings, the
attorney must balance the benefits of increased specificity with the danger
of being subjected to sanctions for using specifically addressed mailings.
Writing direct-mail advertisements with these guidelines in mind should
enable attorneys to utilize this mode of communication without violating
ethical rules.
III. TRADE NAMES
RPC Rule 7.5 prohibits the use of trade names by lawyers or law firms,
with the exception of the term "legal clinic" preceded by the lawyers name
64. But see Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2296 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (a printed advertisement, while
presenting lesser danger of overreaching, is only one step removed from a personal encounter).
65. See RPC Rule 7.1.
66. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206-07 (absolute ban on mailing of announcement cards outside of limited
audience not allowable without showing that inability to supervise was reason. "There is no indication
in the record of a failed effort to proceed along such a less restrictive path.").
67. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2275; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
68. Whitman & Stoltenberg, supra note 4, at 416-20.
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or a geographic location. This prohibition also impermissibly infringes
upon the first amendment freedom of attorneys to alert the public to their
availability. Model Rule 7.5 prohibits the use of trade names only when
their use would violate Model Rule 7.1, that is, when the trade name would
be false or misleading.69 This is more in line with constitutional principles
and Model Rule 7.5 should have been adopted without amendment.
It is clear that the misleading use of a trade name by attorneys is
prohibited, 70 and that the states may prohibit the misleading use of trade
names in professional practices. 71 However, Model Rule 7.5 properly
recognizes that there is no need to prohibit such use so long as no
connection with a government agency or a public or charitable legal
services organization is implied.72 The comments to Model Rule 7.5
acknowledge that the use of deceased firm members names in a firm name
is technically a trade name. 73 Nonetheless, such designations have proved
useful ways of identifying firms to the public. Other trade names, while
distasteful to some lawyers, would provide easy and less intimidating
access to law firms.
The recent case of Matter of Von Weigan,74 recognizes the usefulness of
trade names. No discipline was imposed on an attorney using the monicker
of "The Country Lawyer" in his advertisements. 75 The court read the New
York prohibition on trade names narrowly, and, in light of its purpose of
preventing deception and confusion among consumers, found that the trade
name did not merit discipline. Matters of taste and dignity simply do not
constitute the substantial state interests necessary to prohibit nonmislead-
ing commercial speech. 76
IV. CONCLUSION
Commercial speech, including attorney advertising, is protected under
the first amendment. While representing an improvement over prior rules,
Washington's Rules of Professional Conduct impermissibly restrict adver-
tising in at least two areas. Direct mail contact with persons known to need
69. Model Rule 7.5(a).
70. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2275; RPC Rule 7.1.
71. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
72. Model Rule 7.5 comment.
73. Id.
74. 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S. 2d 40, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985).
75. 470 N.E.2d at 845.
76. Id. at 844. See also Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2280 (Court was "unsure" that state's interest in the
dignity of attorney's communications with the public was substantial enough interest to justify
abridgment of first amendment); R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205-06 (in absence of finding that mentioning
attorney was admitted to the United States Supreme Court Bar was misleading, discipline was
improper, even though the emphasis of such information was in bad taste).
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legal services should not have been completely banned, since such mail-
ings can provide important information to consumers with an immediate
need for that information, and since labeling and filing requirements are
less restrictive alternatives for regulation. Likewise, the permissible uses of
trade names should be expanded. Nonmisleading trade names provide an
easy and nonintimidating method of identifying law firms to the public,
thereby encouraging better access to legal services.
Tim J. Filer
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